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Many  countries  are  implementing  capital  adequacy  standards  developed 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Bank  for  International  Settlements  (BIS),  which 
explicitly  link  each bank's  minimum  capital-to-asset  ratio  to  the riskiness  of 
its  operations.  In  this  paper,  we  use  a  contingent  claim  framework  to 
examine the general questions of  what goals a risk-based  capital framework 
might  be  designed  to  achieve  and  how  risk-based  standards  might  be 
expected to  influence bank  behaviour.  We identify  two  related  but  distinct 
regulatory  policy  goals,  and  derive a  capital  adequacy  rule to  achieve each 
goal:  a  liability-value  (LV)  rule  designed  to  limit  the  contingent  liability 
borne  by  the  deposit  guarantor  per  dollar  of  deposits;  and  a  failure- 
probability  (FP)  rule  designed  to  limit  the probability  of  bank  insolvency. 
We show  that  an  LV  rule  is  likely  to  push  banks  toward  low-risk,  low- 
capital combinations, whereas an FP rule is likely  to  encourage high risk and 
high  capital  ratios.  The  results  suggest  that  restrictions  on  bank  asset 
holdings  and  on overall  financial  leverage  may  be desirable in  conjunction 
with risk-based  capital standards. 
We then consider the extent to  which the BIS standards reflect either ar, FP 
or  an  LV  approach  to  capital  regulation.  The BIS  standards  assign  risk 
weights  to  various  types of  assets, and  establish  a  minimum  ratio of  capital 
to  the sum  of  risk-weighted  assets.  We find  that  a  BIS-type  standard  with 
appropriately chosen weights could be an extremely close approximation  to  a 
rule designed  to  achieve either goal, but that the actual weightings contained 
in  the accord  are most  consistent  with an FP rule.  However, we show that 
the weight  assigned  to  riskless assets  should  be negative if  regulatory goals 
make an LV rule desirable; we also find that under either LV or FP rules the 
weight  given  to  risky  assets  probably  should  be  substantially  higher  than 
established  in  the  BIS  agreement.  The optimal  weights  also depend  on  the 
typical  range of  risks  in  bank  portfolios.  Since this  range  may  vary  from 
one financial  system  to  the  next,  it  may  be desirable to  retain  a  degree of 
national discretion in  setting the precise weightings. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Risk-based  capital  standards  are being  implemented  in  Australia  and  many 
other countries under  the guidance of  the Basle-based  Bank  for International 
Settlements.  These  standards  require  each  bank's  capital  to  exceed  some 
proportion  of  an  adjusted  asset  base.  This  base  is  calculated  by  applying 
fractional  risk  weights  to  the  dollar  value  of  various  types  of  assets  and 
converting  off-balance-sheet  exposures  to  "credit  equivalents".  By  more 
directly  linking  bank  capital  to  the  riskiness  of  bank  portfolios,  the  new 
standards  may  give  regulators  better  control  over  the  safety  of  banking 
systems.  For  example,  Kim  and  Santomero  (1988)  show  that  risk-based 
standards can be designed so that  the probability  of  bank  failure is bounded 
by  any  particular  level  desired  by  regulators.  Under  traditional  capital 
requirements,  in  contrast,  required  capital  is  not  linked  explicitly  to  banks' 
chosen level of asset risk and the probability  of  failure may be higher  than is 
desirable. 
However,  the  mean-variance  framework  used  by  Kim  and  Santomero  has 
received  some criticism.  Keeley  and  Furlong  (1990)  argue that  the  model 
ignores the fact that  limitations  to  shareholder  liability, combined with  some 
degree of  imperfectly priced  government backing  of  bank  liabilities  in  most 
countries,'  cause  the  economic  value  of  bank  liabilities  to  be  sensitive  to 
bank  risk-taking.  This  sensitivity  violates  one  of  the  fundamental 
assumptions  of  the  mean-variance  model,  making  it  inappropriate  for 
studying bank decision making.  To address this issue, several recent  papers 
(Marcus (1984)  and  Furlong and Keeley (1989),  for example) use contingent 
claim techniques to  model the value of  a bank  and  study the bank's portfolio 
In  many  countries  depositor  protection  is  provided  by  government  or  central  bank 
guarantee, while  in others the protection is  provided  through a deposit insurance scheme. 
In  either case,  the  ultimate backing  of  the  national government .is usually  implicit  if  not 
explicit. choice problem. 
In  this  paper  we use  a  contingent  claim  framework  to  examine  risk-based 
capital standards.  Like Kim  and  Santomero we derive standards that bound 
the probability  of  bank  insolvency  or failure;  we  refer  to  these  as  failure- 
probability  or "FP" rules.  We also consider standards designed  to  limit  the 
contingent  liability  arising  from  the  government's  commitment  to  protect 
depositors;  we  refer  to  these  as  liability-value  or  "LV"  rules.2  Although 
these two  regulatory  goals are related, they are not  identical.  For example, 
an FP rule treats all bank insolvencies as equally costly, whereas an LV rule 
considers the  size of  the  expenditure required  to  protect  depositors  in  each 
potential  insolvency.  Hence  a  policy  designed  to  achieve  one  goal  may 
differ from a policy designed to achieve the other. 
The paper has two  main objectives.  The first is to  characterise FP and  LV 
capital standards and  compare bank  behaviour under each type of  rule.  We 
are particularly  interested  in  whether  banks are more likely  to  choose high- 
risk,  high-capital  positions  under  one rule than  under  another.  The second 
main  objective is to  study  the feasibility  of  constructing  standards similar to 
the BIS  standards - specifying risk weights  to be applied  to  different classes 
of  assets - that come close to achieving the goals studied here,  The analysis 
is  similar  to  that  of  Kendall  and  Levonian  (1992),  although  that  paper 
develops  the  theoretical  model  within  the  context  of  an  explicit  deposit 
insurance  system  in  which  banks  pay  insurance  premiums.  This  paper 
generalises the  results  to  the  case of  a  possibly  implicit  deposit  guarantee, 
thus making  the model  more broadly applicable.  The assumptions  regarding 
Related papers include Sharpe (1978), Ronn and Verma  (1989), and Duan, Moreau  and 
Sealey  (1991).  Sharpe  introduces  the  idea of  designing  risk-based  capital  standards  to 
hold  constant the value of  the government  liability.  Ronn  and Verma  use the contingent 
claim model to derive estimates of  the capital infusion several banks would have to  make 
in  order to achieve that goal.  Duan, Moreau and Sealey consider FP and LV rules in  the 
context of  risk-based  deposit insurance pricing.  Holding the riskiness  of  assets  constant 
across  banks,  they  derive  combinations  of,  the  capital  ratio  and  the  deposit  insurance 
premium  that  yield  a given constant  probability  of  failure,  and  also derive combinations 
that  yield  a  constant  value of  deposit  insurance per  dollar  of  deposits.  In  contrast,  we 
allow  the riskiness of  assets to  vary  across banks,  and derive combinations  of asset  risk 
and  the  capital  ratio  that  yield  constant  failure  probabilities  and  values  of the  deposit 
guarantee per dollar of deposits. the riskiness of  the environment, and the precise regulatory objectives  under 
which the numerical results are derived, differ substantially from the Kendall 
and Levonian paper, and additional results are presented and discussed. 
We  take  as  a  starting  point  Merton's  (1977)  model  of  a  bank  with 
government guaranteed  deposits, which follows  from Merton's  (1974)  more 
general  model  of  financially-levered  firms.  Bank  failure,  taken  here  as 
synonymous with insolvency, occurs if the value of the bank's deposits at the 
end  of  the  period  exceeds  the  value  of  its  assets.  If  the  bank  fails,  a 
government-backed  deposit guarantor ensures that  depositors are reimbursed 
in  full.  The payout by  the deposit guarantor is either zero or the difference 
between deposits and assets, whichever is larger; hence the deposit guarantee 
can be modelled as an implicit put option on bank assets.  Within this model, 
we derive the guarantor's  liability per dollar of  bank  deposits  and  an upper 
bound  on the probability of bank failure, expressing both as functions  of the 
bank's capital and the riskiness of its assets. 
In  order to  study bank behaviour  we assume that  bank  management  chooses 
asset risk and capital to maximise the value of equity inclusive of  the implicit 
put  option  created  by  the  deposit  guarantee  and  net  of  contributed  capital, 
subject  to  the  constraint  that  the  capital  requirement  be  met.  The model 
suggests  that  under  an  LV  rule  banks  will  choose  low-risk,  low-capital 
portfolios,  while under an FP rule they  are likely  to choose higher  risk and 
higher capital. 
We derive a  simple version  of  the BISIBasle  standards by  assuming  banks 
can purchase only  riskless assets and  one type of  risky  asset.  Risk  weights 
are  calculated  to  yield  "best  fit"  approximations  to  the  LV and  FP rules. 
Under  a fairly wide range of  assumptions,  both  approximations yield  a risk 
weight  for  risky  assets  that  is  above  (in  many  cases  well  above)  the 
maximum  100 percent weight  specified  by  the BIS.  The FP approximation 
yields a weight for riskless assets that is close to  the zero weight assigned by 
the  Basle  standards;  under  the  LV  approximation,  however,  the  weight  is 
substantially  less than zero. 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 presents the model of the value of  a  bank  and  the  corresponding  value  of  the  deposit guarantor's  liability, 
and  obtains an expression for  an upper  bound  on the probability  of  failure. 
Section 3 presents the LV and FP rules and discusses bank  behaviour  under 
each.  Section 4 derives a simple approximation to each capital standard and 
compares the  results  to  the  Basle  standards.  The paper  is  summarised  in 
Section 5,  and some directions for future research are discussed. 
2.  MODEL 
Define  V,  as the  market  value  of  a  bank's  assets  (the  discounted  value  of 
earnings from those assets) and D, as the value of  the bank's  deposits.  For 
simplicity  we  assume that  deposits  are the  bank's  only  liabilities,  and  that 
they  are fully  guaranteed  and  hence  riskless.  Interest  on  deposits  accrues 
continuously  at  the  riskfree  rate,  and  is  payable  at  some future  date  t=T. 
The  bank  makes  decisions  regarding  asset  risk  and  capital  at  the  present 
(t=O),  and  is  monitored  by  bank  supervisors at date TV3 At  the monitoring 
date  T (and  no  sooner),  the  bank  is  declared  insolvent  if  DT>  VT;  in  that 
case, the deposit guarantor pays the depositors DT  and takes control of assets 
worth  VT, suffering a loss of or-  v,. 
We assume that the value of bank assets follows a constant variance diffusion 
process: 
where a >  0 is  the  instantaneous  expected  rate of  return  on  assets, a>O is 
the  instantaneous  standard  deviation  of  the  rate  of  return,  and  dz  is  the 
differential of a standard Wiener process. 
We  have assumed that  the bank's deposits mature at  the  same point  in time that  the bank 
is  monitored  by  authorities.  This  assumption  simplifies  the  presentation  of  the  model 
without substantial effect on  the conclusions. 2.1  The Contingent Liability of the Deposit Guarantor 
Merton  (1977)  has  shown  that  under  the  assumptions  above  the  liabiIity 
associated  with  the  deposit  guarantee  can  be  evaluated  using  the  Black- 
Scholes  option  pricing  equation  for put  options.  The expiration date  of  the 
implicit  option provided by  the deposit guarantor is  date T,  the next point  at 
which  the  bank  can  be declared  insolvent  by  supervisory  authorities.  The 
guarantor's  liability at r=O,  which we denote L, is: 
where Do is  the present  value of  deposits,  Vo  is  the present value of  assets, 
N(*) denotes  the  standard  normal  cumulative  density  function,  and  x  is 
defined as: 
2.2  The Probability of Failure 
As  noted above, bank failure occurs in this model if  the end-of-period  value 
of  assets  V,  is  less  than  the  end-of-period  value  of  deposits  inclusive  of 
continuously-compounded  interest, DT  =  erTDo. As  shown by Smith (1  976, p. 
15), the probability of  failure, which we denote as p, can be written: 
Assuming  that  the expected rate of  return on bank  assets  equals or exceeds 
the  riskfree  interest  rate,  CY >r,  the  probability  of  failure  satisfies  the 
condition  p  2  N(x+u@).  Thus,  N(x+u@)  is  an  upper  bound  on  the 
probability of  failure; we denote this upper bound as FP: 3. TWO RISK-BASED CAPITAL RULES 
Within  the  context  of  our  model,  risk-based  capital  requirements  specify  a 
relationship  between  the  capital  ratio  c I. (V,-DJIV,  and  asset  risk  a.  The 
exact form of the relationship depends on the regulatory  goal being pursued. 
3.1  A Liability-Value Rule 
One  possible  regulatory  goal  that  risk-based  capital  standards  could  be 
designed  to  achieve  is  to  maintain  the  contingent  liability  of  the  deposit 
guarantor  at  some  fixed  level  relative  to  deposits,  irrespective  of  banks' 
operating  decisions.  (This  goal  might  be  especially  attractive  in  countries 
such  as  the  United  States  that  meet  the  cost  of  the  guarantee  through  a 
deposit-based  assessment  on  the  banking  system.)  Dividing  both  sides of 
equation (2) by Do yields  the liability per dollar of bank deposits, which  we 
denote LV: 
where x is as defined in  (3), noting that D,lV,  = 1  -c.  Equation (6) shows that 
the guarantor's  liability  per dollar of  deposits depends only  on  asset risk  a, 
the time to the monitoring date T,  and  the capital ratio c; it is independent of 
bank size and interest rates. 
Level curves LV(a,c)=LVo  give combinations of a and  c that yield the same 
liability  of LV,,  per dollar of  deposits.  Examples  of these curves are shown 
in Figure 1, with T= 1.  It is easily shown that LV(a,c)  is increasing in a and 
decreasing in  c; in words, the guarantor's liability is greater for higher levels 
of  asset  risk  and  for lower  values  of  the  capital  ratio.  Thus a  risk-based 
capital rule designed to limit the liability  imposed by individual banks would 
allow (a,c) combinations on or to the left of one of the level curves. FIGURE 1 
LV  CAPITAL  STANDARDS A  general expression  for  the slope of  the level  curves can be obtained  by 
taking  the  total  differential  of  LV(a,c),  setting  it  equal  to  zero,  and 
rearranging to obtain dc/da: 
where n(e) is the standard normal density function.  For a bank that  is on the 
boundary of  allowable combinations of  a and c, expression (8) specifies the 
increase in capital that  would be required for a small increase in  asset risk. 
This positive  relationship between  risk and  capital  provides the basis  for an 
LV risk-based  capital  standard.  Of  course,  (8) only  gives  the slope of  the 
risk-based  capital  schedule that  holds  the liability  constant.  Policy  makers 
also  would  have  to  determine  an  acceptable  level  of  LV,  to  construct  a 
complete regulatory  standard.  For a  given  value of  the liability  LV,  and a 
given  monitoring  period  T,  (8)  defines  the  capital  ratio  as  an  implicit 
increasing function of asset risk. 
3.2  A Failure-Probability RuIe 
Level  curves  FP(a,c)=FP,  of  the  failure  probability  function  give 
combinations  of  a and c  that  yield  a  constant probability  of  failure equal to 
FP,.  Three examples are plotted  in Figure 2, with  T again set equal to one. 
Like  the  per-dollar  contingent  liability,  FP(a,c)  is  decreasing  in  c,  and 
generally is increasing in a.4 An FP risk-based capital rule designed to  limit 
the probability of  failure would  allow (a,c) combinations on or to  the left of 
one of the constant failure probability curves. 
In  fact, FP  may  be increasing or decreasing  in  a, since for  sufficiently insolvent banks 
the probability  of failure is reduced  by an  increase  in  asset  risk.  A  sufficient condition 
for aFPIau to  be positive is x <  0,  which is satisfied when 0 <  c <  1.  We will  restrict our 
attention to  solvent banks, for whom this rquirement is always met. FIGURE 2 
FP  CAPITAL  STANDARDS To derive the slope of a failure probability  locus we take the total differential 
of  FP(u,c)  =~(x+ufi)  and set it equal to zero: 
~FP  =  -n(x+ofi)  1 
(1  -c)aJT 
For  a  bank  on  the  boundary  of  allowable  combinations  of  a  and  c, 
expression (10) defines  c implicitly as a  function  of  a, and hence specifies 
the increase in capital required for a small increase in asset risk.  As with an 
LV rule,  regulators  would  need  to  determine an acceptable  value  of FP,  to 
actually implement a policy based  on this relationship. 
3.3  Comparing the Two Rules 
The two risk-based capital standards described above differ in the size of the 
increase  in  capital  required  for  any  given  increase  in  asset  risk.  Any 
combination of a and c that a bank might select lies on both an LV locus and 
an FP locus.  Comparison of (8)  and  (10) reveals that a sufficient condition 
for dc/da to  be  greater along  the  liability-value locus than along the  failure- 
probability locus is n(x)/N(x)  +x >  0.' 
Figure 3  shows combinations of  c and  a that make the  slopes of the LV and 
FP loci  equal,  along  the  locus  labelled  n(x)/N(x)+x=O.  Above  this  locus 
LV curves are flatter than FP; the opposite is true below and to the  right  of 
the locus.  Casual observation  suggests that banks  generally have capital and 
asset risk  combinations that put  them  in the lower part of  the  figure.  Thus 
the LV curve is likely to be steeper than the FP curve, implying that an LV 
rule would  dictate  larger capital  responses to changes in  operating  risk  than 
an FP rule.  The difference arises because the FP rule weights all insolvency 
outcomes  equally,  while  the  LV  rule  gives  greater  weight  to  outcomes 
entailing larger losses for the deposit guarantor. 
'  The  useful  fact that  (I-c)n(x+ufi)  = n(x) makes  this  relationship between  the slopes 
obvious.  We consider only  solvent banks,  implying that x<O;  the inequality holds  for - 
8.64 <x <  0. Figure 3 graphs the combinations of  u and c that yield x=-8.64. FIGURE 3 
n(x)/N  (x) + x = 0 
[LV slope  >  FP slopel To compare bank behaviour under the two rules we assume the bank chooses 
a  combination  of  capital  and  risk  to  maximise  the  value  of  equity  net  of 
contributed  capital  (Vo-Do) but  inclusive  of  the  implicit  put  option  (L) 
generated by the guaranteed deposits, subject to the constraint that the capital 
requirement  be  met.  We  assume  that  changes  in  the  capital  ratio  are 
achieved  through  substitution  of  capital  for  deposits,  leaving  the  value  of 
assets unchangedY6  and that assets are purchased  or originated  in competitive 
markets  so that their  value  is  unaffected  by  the  riskiness of  the bank.  The 
total value of equity, which we denote E,  is given by: 
Since  contributed  capital  is  vo-Do  and  the  bank  maximises  E  net  of 
contributed capital, the bank's  effective objective is to maximise the value of 
the implicit put option. 
If  the  bank  changes  its  combination  of  capital  and  risk,  the  value  of  the 
ba'nk's equity changes according to: 
Differentiating  the  expression  for  L  given  in  equation  (2),  and  usirag  the 
definition of c, dE can be rewritten: 
Setting dE equal  to  zero characterises the  bank's  indifference curves  in  the 
(o,c) plane.'  Since  ~(x+ofi)  > 0 and  (1-c)fin(x+ofi)  > 0, the net  value of 
bank  equity  is  decreasing  in  the  capital  ratio  and  increasing  in  asset  risk. 
Furlong and  Keeley  (1989) discuss the relative merits of  modelling bank  capital choices 
with  the value of  assets constant versus deposits constant within a contingent claim model. 
They  conclude  that  a  stronger  logical  case  can  be  made  for  holding  assets  fixed  and 
allowing deposits to vary. 
'  Since the  bank's  indifference curves  reflect  the  total  value  of  the  deposit  guarantee 
rather  than  the  value  per  dollar of  deposits,  they  do  not  coincide with  the  constant-LV 
loci. Thus indifference curves  which  are downward  and  to  the  right  in  the  (o,c) 
plane represent higher values of equity. 
If  the bank's  indifference curves are flatter  than the boundary  implied by  the 
capital  standard,  the  bank  will  be  pushed  toward  low-risk,  low-capital 
portfolios.'  Conversely,  if  the  indifference  curves  are  steeper  than  that 
boundary, the bank  will  be pushed  toward  high-risk,  high-capital portfolios. 
Setting  dE  equal  to  zero  and  rearranging  yields  the  slope  of  the  bank's 
indifference curves: 
Comparing (8) and  (14), the indifference curves are flatter than  the LV rule 
boundary  if  N(x) < (1-c)N@+ofi);  we  know  this  inequality  always  holds, 
since  N(x+ufi)  -N@)/(I  -c) = LV > 0.  Comparing  (10)  and  (14),  the  bank's 
indifference  curves  are  flatter  than  the  FP  rule  boundary  if 
n(x+ufi)lN(x+crfi)  +x < 0.  Figure 4 shows the locus of points for which the 
sIopes are just  equal.  The bank's  indifference  curves are flatter than the FP 
locus  at  points  above  and  to  the  left,  which  as  noted  above  are unlikely 
choices  for actual banks.  Indeed,  these  low-risk,  high-capital  combinations 
are optimal  only  if  the FP rule requires failure probabilities  on the order of 
10"'  or  less.  In  general the  relationship between  the  slopes  is  likely  to  be 
that the LV curves are steeper than  the bank's  indifference curves, while the 
FP curves are flatter: 
In  practice,  banks  probably  would  not  seek  comer  solutions.  Contrary  to  the 
assumptions of  the model,  the total value of  bank assets is not completely independent of 
risk.  Risky  lending is likely  to  be a  source of  economic rents  for the bank,  so that  the 
optimal  a never  would  be zero.  In  addition,  liquidity  considerations  probably  require  a 
non-zero  proportion  invested in  riskless assets, limiting a on  the  upper  end.  Under such 
conditions, an  interior solution  for a and c probably  would  exist, and  the bank would  not 
jump  to  either  extreme.  Gennotte  and  Pyle  (1991) develop  a  model  in  this  spirit,  in 
which  the value  of  bank  assets depends  on a.  We do not  incorporate  this  dependence 
explicitly  in  our  model;  under  reasonable  assumptions  about  functional  forms,  it  would 
likely  alter  the  magnitude  but  not  the  direction  of  the  effects  of  risk-based  capital 
standards. Thus  if  an  LV  rule  is  in  place  banks  will  be  pushed  toward  lower-risk, 
lower-capital  portfolios,  while  an  FP rule  will  push  banks  toward  higher- 
risk, higher-capital  portfolios. 
Limiting  the  probability  of  bank  failure  and  limiting  the  liability  of  the 
deposit guarantor both are plausible regulatory objectives.  Although  the two 
goals  are closely  related,  the  contingent  claim  model  suggests  that  bank 
behaviour  under  a  policy  designed  to  meet  one of  these  goals  may  differ 
markedly  from  behaviour  under  a  policy  designed  to  meet  the  other. 
Moreover,  the  model  suggests  that  the  two  regulatory  goals  may  conflict; 
holding  the  value  of  the  depasit  guarantee  liability  constant  may  result  in 
unacceptably high probabilities of  failure and vice-versa. 
Figure 5 illustrates the potential  conflict.  Suppose that  regulators pursue a 
goal  of  holding  LV  constant  at  0.3%.  AS  shown  above,  under  an  LV 
standard banks will be pushed toward positions of  lower asset risk and lower 
capital ratios; in  terms of Figure 5, they choose a point such as A rather than 
B.  Although  both  points  are  on  the  same  LV  locus  and  hence  lead  to 
identical liabilities for the guarantor, the probability of bank failure is higher 
at A than at B.  Similar conclusions follow if  regulators pursue a constant-FP 
goal.  The high-risk,  high-capital  portfolio chosen under an FP rule is on a 
higher LV locus than the lower-risk portfdlios the bank could choose. 
It  follows that  additional  restrictions  may  be desirable under  either  type of 
rule.  Under  an LV rule a  minimum  ratio  of equity  to  total  assets  may  be 
needed  to  prevent  failure probabilities  from  being  pushed  to  unacceptable 
levels.  Similarly, under  an FP rule restrictions on the range of permissible 
assets and  activities -  perhaps in  the form of  limits  on  holdings  of certain 
types of assets -  may be necessary to set a maximum on a and thereby limit 
the  deposit  guarantor's  liability.  Both  of  these  types  of  supplemental 
restrictions  (leverage  ratios  and  portfolio  limits)  are  already  part  of  the 
regulatory  structure  in  many  countries;  our  results  provide  a  rationale for 
their continued use even under comprehensive risk-based capital standards. FIG-URE  4 
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lndifference Curves Steeper FIGURE 5 
POTENTIAL  POLICY  CONFLICT 4. THE BASLE STANDARDS 
In this  section, we develop a  simple representation  of  the Basle standards, 
and  compare it  to  the  LV  and  FP risk-based  capital  rules  analysed  above. 
On the surface, the Basle risk-based  capital standards bear little resemblance 
to  either  an  LV  rule  or  an  FP  rule.  The  Basle  standards  express  the 
minimum  capital  ratio  not  as a  function  of the  standard deviation  of  asset 
returns  but  as  a  predetermined  fraction  of  a  weighted  sum  of  assets. 
Weighted assets are calculated by applying "risk weights" to the dollar value 
of various types of assets, with the weights ranging from zero to one.  Thus, 
required capital is a linear function of the quantities of assets in different risk 
categories, and the required capital-to-assets ratio is linear in the proportions 
of assets in each category. 
Nevertheless, a simplified  version  of  the Basle standards can be represented 
in  the (a,c) plane.  Assume that there are only two classes of assets, riskless 
and  risky.  Let  g  be the proportion  of  risky  assets  within  the bank's  total 
asset portfolio;  that  is, the bank holds  g V dollars of risky assets and  (l-g)V 
of riskless assets.  Letting W, and W,  be the risk weights applied to risky and 
riskless  assets  respectively,  the  weighted  asset  base  is  calculated  as 
w,~  V + w,(l-T)V;  if  c,  is the risk-based capital ratio (the minimum  ratio of 
capital to risk-weighted  assets), the bank must satisfy the constraint: 
Dividing (16) by  V to express the constraint in  terms of  the capital-to-assets 
ratio,  and  collecting  terms,  the  minimum  capital  ratio  for  a  bank  with 
fraction  in  risky assets is: 
Thus,  a  Basle-type  standard  is  linear  in  the  fraction  invested  in  risky 
 asset^.^ 
Eichberger  (1992)  derives  an  almost  identical  capital  standard,  in  which  the  implied 
minimum capital  ratio  is a  linear  function of  the proportional  investment in  risky  assets, 
within  an  entirely  different  model.  Eichberger's  result  differs  slightly, in  that  both  the The  minimum  capital  ratio  in  (17)  also  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  a. 
Since asset risk  for the bank  is proportional  to the fraction  of  investment  in 
risky  assets,  we  have  u=gd,  where  2  denotes  the  standard  deviation  of 
returns to risky assets.  (In this formulation, a depends on the bank's  choice 
of  g, whereas  5  is determined  by  market  forces.)  Substituting  g =a/&  into 
expression (17), the Basle capital standards restrict the bank's  choices to  lie 
on or above the locus: 
The capital  ratio  constraint  is  linear  in  asset risk  a, and  plots  as a  straight 
line with slope c,(w,  -wJ/5  in the (o,c) plane. 
4.1  Linear Forms as Simple Approximations 
The linear  Basle-type  standard  in  (17)  clearly  is not  equivalent to  either  an 
LV standard or an FP standard.  Under LV or FP rules, the required capital 
ratio (defined  implicitly by  the equations LV(o,c)=LVo  or FP(a,c)=FPo)  is a 
nonlinear function of a.  Nevertheless, the constant LV and FP loci shown in 
Figures  I  and  2 are nearly  linear, which  suggests that  a simpler Basle-type 
standard could  serve as a good  approximation  to  either regulatory  rule.  A 
less complex capital standard might  well be desirable, since simplicity would 
reduce the costs of implementation, enforcement, and compliance. 
To develop a suitable approximation,  let c(a) represent the  minimum  capital 
ratio defined as an implicit function of asset risk, derived using either an LV 
rule or an FP rule.  Assume that most banks choose asset portfolios with risk 
in  the  range  [a8,a**],  and  that  regulators  apply  a  squared-loss  criterion  to 
derive values of w,  and wo  to fit c,,  to c(a) as well as is possible within that 
range.  That is, regulators choose w,  and wo to minimise the loss function: 
proportional investment and the capital  ratio are expressed relative to deposits rather than 
assets. Minimising 2 corresponds to fitting a c,,  line to a locus of c(a) values, 
An indication  of how well the linear risk-based capital schedule approximates 
either an LV or FP locus can be derived from the loss function 2 as defined 
in equation (19).  We define the quantity  p  as: 
where 
and 7 is the mean of the required capital ratio within the range [ar,a**]: 
Note  that  p  = 0 if  2 =2  (the linear capital standard yields  no  improvement 
over simply setting the minimum capital ratio equal to  E  for all banks),  p  = 
1 if 2 = 0 (the linear standard fits the target LV or FP locus perfectly), and 
values  of  p  between  zero  and  one  represent  intermediate  degrees  of  fit. 
Thus  p  is  a  "goodness  of  fit"  measure  analogous  to  the  R2  statistic 
conventionally reported in  regression analysis.IO 
What  are  realistic  values  of  c,,  T, 3,  a',  and  a* ?  Under  the  Basle 
standards equity capital must be at least four percent of  risk-weighted assets, 
implying  c,  =0.04.  We measure time in  years and set T=  1, corresponding 
to  a  one-year  monitoring  interval.  (We  discuss  the  importance  of  this 
assumption in subsection 4.5 below.) 
Selecting values  for the  standard deviation  of  returns  on  risky  assets  3 and 
the  range  [a' ,ao  *]  is  more  complicated.  In  an  analysis  of  the  Australian 
banking sector using contingent claim methods, Gizycki and Levonian  (1992) 
lo This measure of fit weights the difference between c(a) and c,  evenly for all values of 
a between d and d*. If a  linear standard  were implemented,  however,  the  values of a 
chosen  by banks may  or may  not  be evenly distributed  over the [d,  d7  range used  to 
derive asset weights. find  that  the  standard deviation  has  generally  been  in  the  range of  0.02  to 
0.03  since  1983, but  for brief  periods  has  been  above 0.05  and  as low  as 
0.01.  A number of  studies based  on U.S.  data find values around 0.03, and 
thus  are consistent with  the Australian  results.  However,  if  deregulation  of 
the  banking  sector  continues,  banks  may  begin  to  engage  in  a  wider  and 
perhaps  riskier  range of  financial activities,  possibly  increasing  the relevant 
upper bound on risk. 
Accordingly,  we consider values  of  3  equal  to 0.03,  0.05,  and  0.10.  We 
consider  four  combinations  we believe  cover  a  range  of  interest for policy 
purposes;  in  each case we  set the upper  limit  a**=&. The first  case, with 
aS=0.01 and  a**=0.03, corresponds  to  the  average  levels  of  asset  risk 
observed by Gizycki and Levonian for the Australian  banking  sector.  In the 
second  case  we  again  set  the  lower  limit  a*=0.01,  but  let  a*"=0.05, 
corresponding to a slightly wider range of risks that covers most of the range 
found  by  Gizycki  and  Levonian.  The  third  and  fourth  combinations  we 
interpret  as  representing  environments in which  banks  can engage in  much 
riskier activities;  in  both  cases  6 (and  hence  a**) is  equal  to  0.10.  In  the 
third  case the  bottom  end  is  $=0.05,  so  most  banks  have  high  operating 
risk,  whereas  in  the  fourth  case  a*=0.01,  implying  that  banks  cover  a 
spectrum ranging from very low risk to very high risk. 
4.2  Fitting an LV Rule 
Table 1 presents the results of  minimising  the loss function  3 to  fit a linear 
approximation  to  LV  capital  standards."  Three  different  liability  values 
were used:  0.1 percent of deposits, 0.2 percent of deposits, and 0.3 percent 
of deposits.  Each column of  the table presents the results for one of the four 
combinations  of  ($,a**).  One striking implication  of Table 1 is that a linear 
risk-based capital schedule may provide a good approximation to an LV rule; 
the  goodness-of-fit  statistic  (p) is  above  .995  in  every  case.  A  true  LV 
standard would  produce only  a slight improvement in  fit,  at substantial cost 
in terms of  complexity. 
l'  For  all  minimisations,  the  loss  function  integral  was  calculated  numerically,  using 
rectangular approximation with grid size of 0.001. The results  for w, in  Table  1  indicate  that  risky  assets should  be given  a 
weight of well  over 100 percent.  This stands in contrast to the 100 percent 
maximum  risk weight under the Basle standards.  In the case in which bank 
risk  is  low  (1 % <a<3%)  and  the acceptable LV  is  high,  the optimal  risk 
weight on risky assets would still be about 121 percent.  If regulators require 
lower values of the deposit guarantee liability, or if the relevant range of  risk 
for banks is high, then w, must 
Table 1: Linear Approximation to Liability-Value  Standard 
be  much  larger,  up  to  540  percent  in  the  case  of  LV=O.l%  and 
5% <a<  10%.12 
Table  1 also  indicates  that  riskless  assets  should  receive  a  fairly  large 
l2 For  the  United  States,  policy  probably  requires  an  LV  in  the  range  of  0.2 to  0.3 
percent  of  deposits,  to  correspond  to  the  range  of  premiums  charged  for  deposit 
insurance.  In  that  case,  if  risk  remains  at  the  relatively  low  levels  observed  in  past 
studies,  the  Basle  risk  weight  of  100  percent  is  not  far  from  optimal.  However,  if 
structural changes in  the industry result in banks engaging in a riskier range of activities, 
so  that  risky assets have a standard deviation of returns  around  3 = 5  % , then  the highest 
risk weight should be much higher, at 200 percent or more. negative  weight;  wo is  less  than  zero  in  all  cases,  ranging  from  about  -20 
percent  to  -50  percent.  Negative  weights  would  mean  that  banks  could 
reduce  their  measured  total  risk-weighted  assets by  some  fraction  of  their 
holdings  of  riskless assets.  This would  be  a  significant departure from the 
Basle  standards,  which  assign  a  zero risk  weight  to  riskless  assets.I3  The 
largest  negative  weights  correspond  to  the  cases  in  which  assets  are very 
risky;  in  these cases, a constant  value of  the deposit  guarantee liability  can 
only  be  maintained  by  providing  very  strong  encouragement  for  banks  to 
hold  riskless assets.  The w0 weight is  more strongly negative if  authorities 
are  willing  to  tolerate  higher  LV  values,  which  seems  counterintuitive. 
However, note  that  in  these cases the weight  on  risky  assets  also  is  much 
lower;  as  a  result,  the  differential  between  w,  and  wo actually  decreases, 
implying  that  banks  receive less  relative  reward  for  holding  riskless  assets 
rather than risky assets. 
4.3  Fitting an FP Rule 
Table 2  presents  the  weights  resulting  from  minimising  3 to  construct  a 
linear approximation to FP capital standards.  Three different probabilities of 
bank  failure are presented:  5 percent,  10 percent,  and  15 percent.  As  in 
Table 1, each column presents the results for one of the four combinations of 
u*  and  0".  The  very  high  values  of  p  (in  every  case  p  exceeds  .999) 
demonstrate  that  a  simple  linear  rule  could  be  an  extremely  close 
approximation  to  a  theoretically  correct  but  more  complicated  capital 
standard.  The fit is even better than for the LV  rules in Table 1 because the 
FP loci have less curvature overall. 
The calculated  values for w, indicate  lower optimal  weights on risky  assets 
than were found in the LV case.  For some of the cases, w, is actually lower 
than  the  weight  of  100 percent  incorporated  in  the  Basle  standards.  For 
example,  if  asset  risk  is  believed  to  be  relatively  low  so that  the  relevant 
range  is  1  % <  u<3%,  and  authorities  are  willing  to  tolerate  failure 
probabilities  in  the  neighbourhood  of  10 percent  or  15  percent,  an  optimal 
l3 Using different methods, Avery and  Berger (1991) also found that  a negative weight on 
assets in  the  riskless category would be optimal. linear  approximation calls  for  weights  on  risky  assets of  95 percent  or 78 
percent  respectively.  However,  as  with  an  LV  rule,  w1 soars if  a  higher 
range of bank asset risk is used, to well over 300 percent in  the cases where 
the lowest failure probabilities are desired. 
Table 2: Linear Approximation to Failure-Probability Standard 
In  contrast to  the LV  results,  under  an  FP rule the weight given to  riskless 
assets should  be positive,  although  in  several cases  wo  is  extremely  small. 
For  the  lower  risk  cases,  wo  ranges  from  well  under  1 percent  to  a  little 
more than  1% percent, fairly close to the Basle weight of  zero.  Only in the 
case where  all  banks  are very  risky  (5  % <  a <  10%) and  the probability  of 
failure  must  be  held  to  5  percent  does  the  weight  on  riskless  assets  rise 
above 10 percent; in all other cases, wo  is 5 percent or less. 
Based  on the results in Tables 1 and 2, we conclude that the Basle standards 
come closest to  a linear  approximation of  an FP rule where a probability  of 
bank  failure of  10 percent  is deemed acceptable, and banks are assumed to 
have asset risk in the range observed in studies of  the U.S.  banking industry. From  Table 2,  a  best-fit  linear  approximation  to  an  FP rule  under  these 
circumstances requires a weight on risky  assets of  95  percent, very close to 
the  100 percent in the Basle Accord, and  a weight  on riskless  assets of  0.3 
percent,  very close to Basle's zero weight.  With those weights, a Basle-type 
standard approximates an FP rule extremely closely, as indicated by the high 
value of  p. 
4.4  Accommodating Restrictions on the Risk Weights 
Outcomes  reached  through  international  negotiations  may  reflect 
considerations  that  are not  strictly  economic in  nature.  Thus there  may be 
reasons to accommodate restrictions on some of  the parameters of  the capital 
standatd.  In  the  calculations presented  above,  we have taken  as given  the 
basic linear structure of  the capital standards and  the four percent  minimum 
equity capital ratio,  However, there may also be some need to accommodate 
existing risk weights to the extent possible. 
Consider  the  case  of  maintaining  a  risk  weight  of  zero  on  cash-equivalent 
assets.  If  the weight on  riskless  assets wo  is restricted  to  zero as under  the 
Basle standards, the linear risk-based capital schedule in (18) becomes: 
This  is  a  line  through  the  origin  in  the  (a,c)  plane;  as  indicated  in  the 
discussion above, such a line corresponds more closely to an FP rule than an 
LV  rule.  Restricting  wo  to  zero  and  deriving  w,  to  fit  a  constant  FP rule 
yields a linear approximation  that  is slightly steeper than the FP locus.  For 
example, in the case of FPo=  10 percent with  c,  =0.04 and  1  % <  a <  5 % ,  the 
slope  is  1.5768 when  wo  is  restricted  to  be zero,  and  is  1.5704  when  the 
intercept is not restricted.  (Based on the discussion in section 3.3 above, the 
difference  in  slopes  implies  that  an  approximation  with  wo  set  to  zero  is 
slightly  less  likely  to  lead  banks  to  choose high  asset risk  portfolios  than  a 
true  FP rule.)  The fit  to  the  FP standards  is,  of  course,  inferior  to  the 
results obtained when wo is not restricted. 
Alternatively,  the  Basle  weights  of  w,=l  and  wo=O  could  be  taken  as binding  restrictions,  and  the  required  minimum  risk-based  capital  ratio 
adjusted  to  achieve  an  FP goal.  Table  3  shows  the  results  of  such 
calculations, for FP rules with failure probabilities of 5, 10, and  15 percent. 
In view of the Table 2 results, it is not surprising that the cases in the lower 
left corner of  the table  yield  values  of  c,  close to  the  Basle  standard  of  4 
percent.  However, the minimum capital ratio must be raised if  higher levels 
of  banking  risk need  to be covered.  For l % <  a <5  % , c,  should be in the 
range of  5 percent  to  8 percent; under  the highest  of  the upper  bounds  on 
asset risk, capital ratios in the 10 to 15 percent range: might be required. 
Table 3: Optimal Values of c,  (restricting w,=l  and w,=O) 
Another  view  of  the  implications  of  the  standards follows  from taking  the 
Basle  risk  weights  as  given  and  determining  the  FP contour  to  which  the 
Basle standard most closely corresponds.  The results are shown in Table 4, 
for each of  the four risk  cases, and for risk-based  capital ratios of 0.04 and 
0.08.  With  c,=0.04,  the implied  upper  bound  on  the  probability  of  bank 
failure ranges from 9 percent in the lowest risk case to around 36 percent for 
the higher  risk  cases.  Doubling  the  risk-based  capital ratio to  0.08 reduces 
the failure probability  to a trivial 0.3 percent for the low risk case, although 
it remains at levels above 20 percent for the highest risk cases. 
Table 4: Implied Upper Bound on Probability of Failure 
(restricting W,  =  l and W,  =  0) It  is  worth  noting  that  bank  supervisors  in  each  country  do  retain  some 
flexibility under the Basle agreement, especially with regard to the minimum 
risk-based  capital ratio.  The Basle standards set a floor; national authorities 
have the power to require banks to hold  more capital, and  many banks do in 
fact hold  more than  the  minimum.  The results  in this  section support this 
flexibility  as a desirable aspect of the regulations;  bank supervisors in each 
country can tailor the standards somewhat to the riskiness of the environment 
in which their banks operate. 
4.5  The Effect of Alternative Assumptions Regarding T 
All  of the results  presented  above assume that  the  monitoring  interval  T is 
equal to  one year.  Obviously this  is  an arbitrary assumption, and  its  effect 
on  the  computations  can  be  substantial.  Straightforward  differentiation  of 
equations  (5) and  (6)  with  respect  to  T  indicates  that  FP  and  LV  are 
increasing  in  T.  Thus  a  monitoring  interval  shorter  than  one  year  would 
imply  lower  values  of  FP and  LV  for  any given  combination  of  the  other 
parameters,  and the  opposite  for  longer  monitoring  intervals.  As  a  result, 
with  a  lower  value  of  T the  risk  weights  needed  to  achieve any  particular 
targeted  levels of  either the probability of failure or the value of  the deposit 
guarantor's liability would  move toward zero.  l4 
On the  other  hand,  the  failure  probabilities  and  liability  values  used  in  the 
computations  are also  expressed  on  a  per-monitoring-period  basis.  If  the 
monitoring  interval  is  shorter, policy  goals  almost  certainly  would  demand 
l4 The results in the tables can  be  reinterpreted to  provide a feel for the effect of alternate 
assumptions.  Note that within the contingent claim  model, the only way  that T appears is 
in  the term  ufi; moreover, this is the only way  that  a appears.  Hence if the monitoring 
interval  is  not  one  year,  the  computational  consequence  is  effectively  to  stretch  or 
compress  the  a  dimension  by a  factor  of 0.  Any  inferences drawn  from  a  case  in 
which  o=0.10,  for  example,  would  actually  correspond  to  a -0.101fi.  If  the 
monitoring interval is three months rather than  one year  so that T=0.25,  all of  the values 
of  a,  3, a',  and  a"  should  be  doubled;  with  a  corresponding  rescaling  of  coluinn 
headings,  the  figures in  the  tables are still valid.  The policy  interpretations change,  of 
course:  if monitoring intervals are believed  to be less than  one year, the higher-risk cases 
(such as the last two  columns of the  tables) probably represent unrealistically high  values 
of  a, and  the results in the first column of each table become much  more relevant. lower target values of FP and LV; that is, the policy  targets probably decline 
with  T.  For  example,  if  a  failure probability  of  two percent  is acceptable 
over a one-year  horizon then the acceptable probability within a three-month 
interval surely must be lower, perhaps closer to one-half of one percent.  As 
the tables  make clear, lower FP and  LV targets  require higher  risk weights 
(or  larger negative weights on riskless assets in the LV case).  This works in 
the  opposite direction  of  the  parametric  effect  of  T in  the  expressions  for 
LV(a,c)  and FP(a,c).  Put differently, a reduction in T likely requires that LV 
and  FP  be  smaller  to  meet  supervisory  goals,  but  the  implicitly  more 
frequent monitoring also reduces failure probabilities and guarantor liabilities 
in  such a way  that  higher  risk  weights  may  not  be  necessary.  The precise 
degree of  offset  is unknowable,  but  the conclusions  are surely less sensitive 
to assumptions regarding  T than would appear from a simple examination of 
the impact of  Ton the contingent claim model in isolation. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
We have shown within  the  context  of  a contingent  claim  model  of  banking 
that risk-based  capital standards can be derived to fix the value of the deposit 
guarantor's  liability  per  dollar  of  deposits;  we  call  this  an  LV  rule. 
Alternatively,  risk-based capital can place  an upper bound  on the probability 
of  bank  failure  during  any  period,  which  we  refer  to  as  an  FP rule.  We 
examine  the  value-maximising  responses  of  banks  facing  the  constraints 
imposed  by  LV  and  FP risk-based  capital  standards,  assuming  that  barks 
maximise  the  value  of  equity  net  of  contributed  capital.  We  find  that  bank 
behaviour  depends  on  the  type  of  rule  imposed.  The model  suggests that 
low-risk assets will  be  chosen  under  an LV  rule, while  high-risk  assets  are 
likely to be chosen under an FP rule.  Thus while the two rules are plausible 
and  are designed  to  meet  related  regulatory  goals,  they  have  very  different 
implications for bank behaviour. 
The LV and FP standards, while desirable in theory, may be too complicated 
to  be  feasible  in  practice.  We derive a  simple version  of  the  international 
standards actually being  implemented (the BISIBasle standards) and find  that 
those standards could  serve as a good approximation to  either an LV rule or an FP rule.  However, with either type of  rule the "best fit" weight on risky 
assets  is  greater  than  100  percent  under  most  assumptions;  the  weight  on 
riskless assets is close to zero for an FP approximation and substantially less 
than  zero  for  an  LV  approximation.  Judgements  regarding  the  best 
weightings  depend  on  the  range  of  asset  risk  believed  to  be  relevant  in 
practice;  since  this  range  may  vary  from  one  country  to  the  next,  capital 
standards  should  retain  a  degree  of  flexibility  to  allow  national  banking 
authorities to  make necessary adjustments. 
Further research should explore the sensitivity of  the simple linear standards 
to  the number of  asset categories.  Also,  it  would be more accurate to  allow 
for non-zero  correlation  between  asset  categories,  and  to  treat  all  assets  as 
risky  since even government  securities are subject to  interest rate risk.  For 
practical applications to  banking  policy  a better sense of the actual variance- 
covariance  matrix  for various  types  of  bank  assets  is  needed;  estimation  of 
this matrix is the subject of  separate work in progress by  the authors.  Given 
more precise estimates of  the riskiness of various types of  assets, it would be 
interesting  to  re-examine  how  close the  actual  risk  weights  from  the  Basle 
accord come to  either of  the theoretical possibilities  discussed here.  Finally, 
in actual practice regulators probably aim both  to prevent failure and  to  limit 
the  deposit  guarantee  liability;  the  authors  are exploring  the  possibility  of 
representing  risk-based  capital  objectives  as  a  weighted  average of  FP and 
LV . 29 
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